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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Doctrines that define entitlements to indemnification carry high stakes for 
corporate directors and officers because, through a right to indemnity, a 
director or officer may shift litigation-related costs to his or her corporation. A 
right to advancement obliges the corporation to bear the cost of funding an 
ongoing defense, subject to a requirement that the individual repay the 
advanced amounts upon a final determination that the individual is not entitled 
to or eligible for indemnification. Costs may mount during long-running 
proceedings, and the corporation’s present decisionmakers may regret a prior 
decision that supplants their discretion with an enforceable duty to make 
advancements, even when the loan that the advancement represents may prove 
uncollectible in the end. Additionally, rights to indemnification and 
advancement may undercut incentives for proper conduct, but may also make 
service as an officer or director less daunting to qualified candidates, especially 
those who believe a corporation’s circumstances create a material risk of 
litigation against them personally. 
Although the practical stakes and policy tradeoffs are evident, the 
conceptual rationales and normative justifications underlying these doctrines 
are unsettled and potentially in conflict. In particular, indemnification in the 
corporate context is often characterized as an offshoot of common-law agency 
doctrine. Judicial opinions and scholarly treatments refer to agency law in 
general terms in attempting to ground rights to indemnity.1 Despite its 
longevity, the “agency” rationale is weak and not helpful in answering questions 
that inevitably arise. For starters, many within the corporate cast of characters 
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 1. See, e.g., HENRY W. BALLANTINE & GRAHAM L. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 
LAWS 121 (1949) (“The theory of those who drafted the California act as to the basis of reimbursement 
of directors, officers, and employees for litigation expenses incurred in their employment without their 
fault, is not that of benefit to the corporation but that of a duty of a principal to indemnify and 
reimburse his employee or agent for expenses springing from the proper performance of the duties of 
his employment.”). 
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who may be indemnified and receive advancements are not agents within the 
common-law definition. Moreover, indemnification doctrines within agency law 
diverge in their presuppositions and operation from statutory indemnification 
provisions. Agency law presupposes an agent’s indemnity rights are subject to 
agreement with the principal, which enables the principal to assess its risks 
relative to individual agents. Agency law also presupposes the existence of a 
principal capable of credible arm’s-length bargaining with the agent, in contrast 
to the structural reality that (absent action by shareholders) a corporation’s 
board will adopt policies and make individual decisions concerning indemnity 
and advancement for its members as well as for officers who work closely with 
the board. Additionally, within agency law, the rationale for indemnification is 
to internalize into the principal’s enterprise the costs incurred by an agent who 
acts with actual authority on the principal’s behalf. Thus, common-law agency 
allocates to the principal the right to control the defense of a suit against an 
agent, in contrast to the assumption underlying indemnification in the corporate 
context, which allocates control to the individual defendant. Finally, under 
some corporation statutes and the governance documents of many 
corporations,2 service as a corporation’s “employee or agent” is equivalent to 
service as a director or officer, with consequences potentially at odds with those 
that stem from agency law itself. 
In the corporate context, indemnification is better grounded, as in the 
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), in the necessity of furnishing 
corporate directors with “appropriate protection against personal risk.”3 
Likewise, it is best to focus on directors (who typically do not act as a 
corporation’s agents) as the prototypical “object of concern” whose rights to 
indemnification and advancement will stem from bylaws and other corporate-
governance documents that operate categorically. That directors typically take 
action collectively, as members of boards and committees of boards rather than 
as individuals, corresponds with categorical treatment through a governance 
document. Such a focus is warranted, moreover, from the perspective of 
regulating “the concerns of self-dealing when directors provide for their own 
indemnification and expense advances,”4 in contrast with arm’s-length, one-by-
one agreements with corporate personnel who are not members of the board. 
To be sure, as the MBCA’s official comments implicitly acknowledge, the 
position of officers, especially senior executive officers, does not fit neatly and 
exclusively into either an “agent” or a “non-agent” category for indemnification 
purposes. An officer’s role often places the officer within the common-law 
definition of agent and assumes the officer possesses a specific set of skills that 
the officer must deploy to serve the interests of the corporation as the officer’s 
principal.5 Directors’ duties, in contrast, are more generalized considerations of 
 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 40 and 42. 
 3. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ch. 8, subchapter E, introductory cmt. 1 (2008). 
 4. Id. § 8.56 official cmt. 
 5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006). 
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care and loyalty; in the MBCA’s formulation, a director’s duties are to act in 
good faith and “in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation.”6 On the other hand, directors may empathize with 
officers with whom they work through service on the board or board 
committees, suggesting that the board’s dealings with officers in this context 
may have a texture that is not fully at arm’s-length,7 and that the corporation’s 
status as a principal is, at the least, complicated. 
II 
INDEMNIFICATION WITHIN AGENCY LAW 
The common law defines an agent as a person who consents to act “on the 
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control.”8 Acting “on behalf of” 
a principal means acting as the principal’s representative in legally salient 
interactions with third parties, who may either be within the principal’s 
organization or external to it.9 The basic idea is that an agent acts as the 
principal’s representative, whether or not the principal benefits from the agent’s 
actions “on behalf of” the principal. 
The representative quality of an agent’s position explains much about 
indemnification doctrine. If an agent makes a payment on behalf of a principal, 
subject to the terms of any contract between principal and agent, the principal 
has a duty to indemnify the agent only when the agent (1) acted with actual 
authority in making the payment, or (2) acted without actual authority, but 
benefitted the principal and did not act officiously (that is, without excuse).10 An 
agent acts with actual authority by acting consistently with a reasonable 
interpretation of any manifestation from the principal concerning how the 
principal wishes the agent to act.11 One might think of an agent’s action under 
these circumstances as an extension of the principal and as an action that, 
through the agent’s intermediation, the principal has taken itself. 
The same perspective also explains the scope of a principal’s duty to 
indemnify an agent for litigation-related costs borne by the agent unless this 
duty is abrogated by a contract between them. The principal’s duty is limited to 
claims asserted by third parties against the agent and to circumstances in which 
the agent acted with actual authority in taking the action at issue in the third 
 
 6. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2008). 
 7. Id. ch. 8, subchapter E, introductory cmt. (observing that the “spectre of structural bias” is 
created by the prospect of “sympathetic directors approving indemnification for themselves or for 
colleagues on the board or for officers, who may work closely with board members”). 
 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
 9. Id. § 1.01 cmt. g. 
 10. Id. § 8.14(2). On “officious,” see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. d (2000) (no liability in restitution for benefit intentionally conferred unless “the 
circumstances of the transaction are such as to excuse the claimant from the necessity of basing a claim 
to payment on a contract with recipient of benefit”). 
 11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006). 
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party’s claim.12 The principal’s duty is not triggered unless the agent gives the 
principal timely notice of the third party’s suit so that the principal may furnish 
the agent with a defense, a requirement that treats the agent’s authorized 
action—and litigation in its aftermath—functionally as action of the principal.13 
Moreover, a principal’s duty to indemnify extends downward in a chain of 
agency relationships to subagents (agents appointed by agents) unless the 
subagent agrees otherwise.14 Indeed, a subagent’s claim for indemnification 
occasioned a memorable judicial rationalization of indemnification doctrine. In 
Admiral Oriental Line v. United States,15 a ship’s owner engaged an agent under 
an operating contract; the agent, in turn, engaged a subagent to fit out the ship 
in the Philippines. An owner of cargo on the ship sued the subagent in the 
aftermath of a typhoon in which all hands aboard (and the cargo) were lost. The 
subagent successfully defended against the suit and sought indemnity from the 
principal. The court held that the principal had a duty to indemnify the 
subagent against the costs of its successful defense. The appointing agent had a 
duty to indemnify the subagent; were it to discharge that duty, the principal 
would have a duty to indemnify the appointing agent. Thus, the subagent may 
proceed directly against the principal. More broadly, Learned Hand, writing for 
the court, explained: 
The doctrine stands upon the fact that the venture is the principal’s, and that, as the 
profits will be his, so should be the expenses. Since by hypothesis the agent’s outlay is 
not due to his mismanagement, it should be regarded only as a loss, unexpected it is 
true, but inextricably interwoven with the enterprise.16 
The principal’s downward-reaching duty to indemnify subagents does not, 
however, encompass performing an appointing agent’s duty to pay 
compensation to the subagents it engages. Unless it agrees to do so, a principal 
does not bear the risk of making payments to subagents that a financially 
unreliable appointing agent may have promised.17 In Judge Hand’s terminology, 
compensation agreements between an appointing agent and its employees and 
other agents remain outside the principal’s enterprise, not interwoven with it. 
Instead, the liabilities created by such agreements remain part of the agent’s 
“enterprise,” as do many costs incurred by specific types of agents.18 
 
 12. Id. § 8.14 cmt. d. 
 13. Id. 
 14. A subagent “is a person appointed by an agent to perform functions that the agent has 
consented to perform for the agent’s principal and for whose conduct the appointing agent is 
responsible to the principal.” Id. § 8.14(1) & cmt. b. 
 15. See generally Admiral Oriental Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1936). 
 16. Id. at 202. 
 17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.13 cmt. d (2006). For cases applying this principle, see 
id. reporter’s n.b. 
 18. Id. cmt. a. (noting that real-estate agents with whom property is listed for sale customarily bear 
the cost of advertising the property); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 38(3)(a) & cmt. e (2000) (a lawyer may not, unless the contract with the client requires 
otherwise, “charge separately for the lawyer’s general officer and overhead expenses”; prevailing 
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A final component of agency doctrine completes the picture. If an agent 
causes loss to the principal through unauthorized actions and other breaches of 
duty, the agent has a duty to compensate the principal for the loss.19 Loss to the 
principal may stem from breaches of the agent’s basic duty of loyalty20 as well as 
from conduct for which the agent lacked actual authority but nonetheless bound 
the principal—through the operation of apparent authority—to third parties 
who reasonably believed the agent to be authorized.21 A principal has no duty to 
indemnify an agent (unless it has agreed to do so) for losses incurred by the 
agent stemming from unauthorized conduct that inflicted loss on the principal. 
III 
CORPORATE LAW CONTRASTED 
The background of common-law agency highlights both the distinctiveness 
and complexity of indemnification in the corporate context.22 One minor datum 
is telling: In the Restatement (Third) of Agency, the section addressing a 
principal’s duty to indemnify its agent runs for eleven pages inclusive of the 
reporter’s notes, while the MBCA’s chapter 8, subchapter E runs for thirty-
three pages. Delaware’s three-page counterpart,23 a relatively long section 
within the Delaware general corporation law, is amplified by many cases. Two 
tenets of indemnification in the corporate context underlie its divergence from 
common-law agency doctrine and help explain its relative complexity: (1) the 
circumstances under which indemnification and advancement are permissible 
and often, in practice, mandatory; and (2) more narrowly, the structure of 
indemnification rights in connection with litigation. 
A basic structural fact about the corporate context adds to the complexity. 
First, unless the principal’s contract with an agent so requires, the principal’s 
duty to indemnify a common-law agent against a loss incurred by the agent 
requires the agent to act with actual authority or confer a benefit on the 
principal through the agent’s underlying conduct. In contrast, in the corporate 
setting, “[t]he concept of indemnification recognizes that there will be situations 
in which the director does not satisfy all of the elements of the standard of 
conduct set forth [by statute] . . . but where the corporation should nonetheless 
be permitted (or required) to absorb the economic costs of any ensuing 
 
practice that disbursements made by lawyer “to persons outside the office for hired consultants . . . and 
the like ordinarily are charges in addition to the lawyer’s fee.”). 
 19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14 cmt. b (2006). 
 20. Id. § 8.01 cmt. d(1) (“An agent’s breach subjects the agent to liability for loss that the breach 
causes the principal.”). 
 21. Id. § 2.03. 
 22. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ch. 8, subchapter E, official cmt. (2008) (“The provisions for 
indemnification and advance for expenses . . . are among the most complex and important in the entire 
Act.”). Subchapter E is “based almost entirely on an amendment to the 1969 Model Act adopted in 
1980 and substantially revised in 1994.” Id. 
 23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2010). 
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litigation.”24 The challenge, of course, is to identify “situations” in which a 
director should be indemnified notwithstanding the director’s conduct and 
distinguish them from situations in which indemnification is unacceptable. 
Although establishing that an agent acted with actual authority or conferred 
a benefit on the principal can be less than straightforward, the normative 
concepts readily connect the agent’s underlying conduct with the principal’s 
“enterprise.” In contrast, under the MBCA, whether a corporation may 
indemnify a director against the costs of an unsuccessful defense turns on 
whether the director acted in good faith and in conduct undertaken in an 
official capacity with a reasonable belief that the conduct was in the 
corporation’s best interests.25 For conduct not undertaken in an official 
capacity—which does seem removed from any definition of the principal’s 
“enterprise”—a director must have acted in good faith and with a reasonable 
belief that the conduct “was at least not opposed to the best interests of the 
corporation.”26 Indemnification in the wake of an unsuccessful defense of 
criminal charges requires that the director had “no reasonable cause to believe 
his conduct was unlawful.”27 A corporation may oblige itself to exercise its 
power to indemnify in these situations through a provision in its articles or 
bylaws, or through a contract or resolution adopted by its board.28 Additionally, 
under the MBCA, shareholders may, through a provision in the corporation’s 
articles, approve enhanced duties to indemnify directors, up to the limit of 
situations in which an articles provision could not exculpate a director against 
liability. Nonexculpable situations are: liability for receipt of a financial benefit 
to which the director was not entitled, an “intentional infliction of harm on the 
corporation or its shareholders,” an intentional violation of criminal law, and 
voting or assenting to an unlawful distribution of corporate assets to 
shareholders.29 
Thus, a corporation has power to—and may undertake a duty to—
indemnify a director when the director’s underlying conduct has itself likely 
caused loss to the corporation. Additionally, the MBCA itself imposes a duty to 
indemnify when a director is wholly successful in the defense of the underlying 
proceeding.30 Amounts indemnified by a corporation may include more than the 
costs of an unsuccessful defense; amounts paid in settlement, fines, and 
penalties are within the MBCA’s defined category of “liability” that may be 
indemnified.31 To be sure, common-law agency acknowledges that a principal 
 
 24. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ch. 8, subchapter E, official cmt. (2008). 
 25. Id. § 8.51(1)(a)(i). 
 26. Id. § 8.51(1)(a)(ii). 
 27. Id. § 8.51(1)(a)(iii). 
 28. Id. § 8.58(a). 
 29. Id. § 2.02(b)(5). One expanded category of liability that an articles provision might cover would 
be intentional tort claims brought by third parties. 
 30. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.52 (2008).  
 31. Id. § 8.50 (3) (defining “liability”). 
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could contract to indemnify its agents, but a major structural difference from 
the corporate context is telling. Agency law presupposes that agent and 
principal are separate persons and that the principal determines at arm’s-length 
how its interests might best be served, including the terms on which it contracts 
with its agents. In the corporate context, the board of directors is the 
decisionmaker on indemnification and advancement (unless shareholder 
involvement is sought), and the board’s members have an intense interest in 
how indemnification rights are structured. 
Moreover, indemnification’s scope is broader in the corporate context 
because it is mandatory in connection with the costs of litigation and other 
proceedings to a degree well beyond agency doctrine. A principal’s duty to 
indemnify an agent against litigation expenses is limited to actions brought 
against the agent by third parties. Corporate indemnification, in contrast, 
encompasses claims made by the corporation itself as well as claims made on its 
behalf by shareholders and other representative parties, such as bankruptcy 
trustees, but not amounts paid to settle or satisfy obligations stemming from 
such claims.32 Indeed, in the oft-told history leading to the addition of 
indemnification provisions to corporation statutes, the court held in New York 
Dock Co. v. McCollum33 that the corporation had no obligation to indemnify 
directors who were vindicated in a derivative suit because the directors’ triumph 
yielded no benefit for the corporation.34 From the perspective of common-law 
agency, the outcome in McCollum may seem unsurprising; had the shareholder 
suit succeeded in recovering a judgment, it would have benefitted the 
corporation (the principal). However, the prospect that a corporate principal 
might be obliged to indemnify its personnel in connection with direct claims it 
asserts against them is startling, even more so if the principal must fund their 
defenses through advancements.35 On the other hand, from the perspective of a 
corporation’s board of directors, the prospect that the corporation itself might 
sue one or all of them is not unimaginable. The principal—the corporation—
may retain a continuous identity, but the identity of those in control of it may 
shift, and a new controlling shareholder (or a bankruptcy trustee) may look 
unfavorably on decisions made by now-former directors. 
The MBCA reflects some of agency law’s insights. The official comments 
urge consideration of “whether obligatory expense advance is intended for 
direct suits by the corporation as well as for derivative suits by shareholders in 
the right of the corporation,” noting that advancement could require funding a 
 
 32. Id. § 8.51(d)(1) (2005). 
 33. See generally N.Y. Dock Co. v. McCollum, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939). 
 34. See, e.g., James H. Cheek III, Control of Corporate Indemnification: A Proposed Statute, 22 
VAND. L. Rev. 255, 259 (1968); James J. Hanks, Jr. & Larry P. Scriggins, Protecting Directors and 
Officers from Liability—The Influence of the Model Business Corporation Act, 56 BUS. LAW. 3, 5–13 
(2000). 
 35. It has been argued that corporate indemnification provisions were not intended to apply to 
direct suits. See Diane H. Mazur, Indemnification of Directors in Actions Brought Directly by the 
Corporation: Must the Corporation Finance Its Opponent’s Defense?, 19 J. CORP. L. 201, 205 (1994). 
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defendant’s defense “even where the board of directors has already concluded 
that he has engaged in significant wrongdoing.”36 Tellingly, though, the MBCA 
provisions, like those in all other states, focus solely on specifying a 
corporation’s power and obligations to indemnify individual actors associated 
with it, not the individuals’ obligations to indemnify the corporation against loss 
caused by their breaches of duty. Nonetheless, a corporation may not indemnify 
against amounts paid to settle claims asserted by or in its right, or to satisfy 
obligations stemming from such claims.37 The consequence of indemnification 
would be payments of the same amount to and from the same corporate 
“enterprise.”38 Finally, the MBCA recognizes, as does agency doctrine, that not 
all that befalls an individual is a consequence of a position held by that 
individual; whether a corporation may indemnify a director against liability 
depends on whether it stems from a proceeding to which the director is “a 
party . . . because he is a director.”39 
IV 
IMPLICATIONS 
Although common-law agency doctrine is inadequate as an underpinning 
for indemnification in the corporate context, contrasts between the two 
highlight policy choices made by drafters of corporation statutes. Agency 
doctrine may also afford insights into specific points of difficulty in applying 
indemnification and advancement bylaws and statutes, in particular the 
inclusion of “agents”—among those whom a corporation has a duty to 
 
 36. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.58 official cmt. (2008). 
 37. Id. § 8.51(d). A court may order indemnification of amounts paid to settle a shareholder 
derivative suit or a suit alleging a director received an improper financial benefit if the court determines 
that indemnification is “fair and reasonable” in light of “all relevant circumstances.” See id. § 8.54 
(a)(3) & official cmt. A corporation may obligate its board “to cooperate in the procedural steps 
required to obtain a judicial declaration” that indemnification should be ordered. Id. § 8.59 official cmt. 
In contrast, under the counterpart Delaware statute, indemnification of settlement amounts is not 
available in derivative suits. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (2010). The Delaware statute also 
requires judicial approval for indemnification of the costs of an unsuccessful defense of an action 
brought by or in the right of the corporation upon a showing that the proposed indemnitee “is fairly 
and reasonably entitled to indemnity for such expenses which the [court] shall deem proper.” Id.  
 38. More pragmatically, if it is less expensive for a corporation to indemnify its directors against 
the damage amounts claimed in a shareholder derivative suit than to bear the costs of inquiry required 
to seek judicial dismissal of the suit, more “meritless derivative proceedings” might be filed “in order to 
generate small but immediately payable attorneys’ fees.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51 official cmt. 
(2008). The process that may lead to judicial dismissal under the MBCA begins with a shareholder 
demand on the board (which is mandatory in most circumstances) followed by reasonable inquiry and a 
determination by the board or a committee that maintaining the derivative suit is not in the 
corporation’s best interests. Id. § 7.44. 
 39. Id. § 8.51. On this general limitation, compare Stifel Financial Corp. v. Cochran, 809 A.2d 555, 
562 (Del. 2002) (holding a former officer acted in personal, not official, capacity in obtaining an 
allegedly improper compensation from the corporation), with Reddy v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 
No. CIV.A. 19467, 2002 WL 1358761, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2002) (finding the financial fraud that 
enabled a former officer to obtain improper compensation was committed in the course of performing 
official duties). 
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indemnify or make advancements—as well as issues associated with former 
officers’ claims for advancement. 
A.  Differentiating Among “Agents” 
Some corporation statutes include “agents” in a generic cast of corporate 
characters for purposes of indemnification. Indeed, the California statute uses 
“agent” as the inclusive term in this context; under section 317(a) of the general 
corporation law, an “agent” is “any person who is or was a director, officer, 
employee or other agent of the corporation.”40 In contrast, the MBCA drafters 
chose to confine its coverage to directors and officers, noting that a corporation 
has power, consistent with applicable law, to indemnify and make 
advancements to its employees and agents.41 The drafters also note, though, that 
many corporations exercise this power “in the same provisions in the articles, 
bylaws, or otherwise in which they provide for expense advance and 
indemnification for directors and officers.”42 Viewed from the perspective of 
common-law agency, this practice may not always be wise. 
The term “agents,” even more than “employees,” does not work well as a 
trigger for categorical rights. Consider first the heterogeneous host of 
nonemployee agents that a corporation might engage: real-estate, commodities, 
securities, and insurance brokers; securities-transfer agents; lawyers; private 
investigators and debt collectors; and on and on. The functions agents perform 
vary widely, as do the legal risks associated with their activity. Some litigation-
related expenses borne by an agent may conventionally be viewed as part of the 
agent’s cost of doing business, not intertwined with the principal’s “enterprise,” 
against which the agent should insure itself. These factors are all consistent with 
specifying indemnification rights (if any) through individualized contracts. 
Indeed, the MBCA’s drafters urge “careful consideration” about “extending 
mandatory maximum indemnification and expense advance to employees and 
agents” because this may not be necessary to “encourag[e] qualified individuals 
to serve,” given that enabling this encouragement justifies such rights for 
directors and officers.43 
Cases in which agents seek indemnification or advancement of expenses 
under a generic provision in a corporation statute or corporate-governance 
document illustrate the misfit of “agents” in this context. In several recent cases, 
lawyers sued by corporate clients sought indemnification or advancement, 
under either a corporate bylaw or statute, on the basis that they were parties to 
 
 40. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (2010). This formulation originated in 1975. The statutory predecessor 
did not define an inclusive term for corporate personnel whom the corporation might indemnify. See 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(a) (1947) (“When a person is sued . . . because he is or was a director, officer, 
or employee of a corporation . . . .”). The formulation in section 317 is confusing because a director as 
such is not a corporation’s agent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (2006) 
(explaining that directors ordinarily are not agents either of a corporation or its shareholders). 
 41. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ch. 8, subchapter E, official cmt. (2008). 
 42. Id. § 8.56 official cmt. 
 43. Id. 
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the suit because they had served as an agent of the corporation. The cases reach 
outcomes that are not entirely consistent. For example, in Fasciana v. Electronic 
Data Systems Corp., the plaintiff sought advancement of litigation expenses 
under the language of a corporate bylaw that mandated advancement to, among 
others, the corporation’s agents.44 The court held that the bylaw did not apply to 
the plaintiff’s work for his former client to the extent he furnished advice on a 
private basis, as opposed to interacting with third parties on the corporation’s 
behalf.45 The court reasoned that the Delaware legislature, in using the word 
“agent” in the indemnification statute, intended “the term to be used in the 
more precise common law definition, which embraces the ‘essential’ 
requirement that an agent have ‘the power to act on behalf of the principal with 
third persons.’”46 In contrast, in cases in which a lawyer acts as a corporation’s 
litigation counsel, the lawyer surely interacts with third persons on behalf of the 
client.47 But outcomes in cases involving this variation turn, additionally, on the 
nature of the client’s claim against its former counsel. In Jackson Walker L.L.P. 
v. Spira Footwear,48 in which the court held that a mandatory-advancement 
bylaw applied, the client’s claim was that the plaintiff law firm breached its 
fiduciary duties through litigation maneuvers that furthered the cause of 
shareholders who were then in control of the corporation. In contrast, in 
Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell49 and Channel Lumber 
Co. v. Porter Simon, Inc.,50 the lawyers succeeded in the defense of malpractice 
claims and then proceeded under statutory provisions mandating 
indemnification. The lawyers lost in both cases, with both courts holding that 
they were not “agents” within the meaning of the statute. Western Fiberglass 
relies solely on a finding that the purpose of the statute was to “protect persons 
exercising corporate discretion and authority, not the attorneys those persons 
hire to give them legal advice.”51 Channel Lumber relies on a comparable 
finding of statutory purpose as well as the court’s conclusion that outside 
lawyers are independent contractors, in a role similar to that of “other 
professionals, such as doctors and nurses.”52 Jackson Walker, like most 
 
 44. Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 829 A.2d 160, 163 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 45. Id. at 172–73. 
 46. Id. at 169 (quoting Borders v. Townsend Assocs., No. CIV.A. 98L12023RFS, 2002 WL 725266, 
at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2002). 
 47. See Jackson Walker L.L.P. v. Spira Footwear, Inc., No. 3150-VCP, 2008 WL 2487256, at *6 
(Del. Ch. June 23, 2008) (question of first impression under Delaware law where a corporation’s 
litigation counsel acted as its agent). 
 48. Id. 
 49. W. Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34, 34 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
 50. Channel Lumber Co. v. Porter Simon, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 482, 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 51. W. Fiberglass, Inc., 789 P.2d at 38. 
 52. Channel Lumber Co., 93 Cal Rptr. 2d at 488. 
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authorities,53 finds that the law firm acted as its client’s agent in its actions as 
litigation counsel but carefully notes the absence of malpractice claims.54 
Mirroring the outcomes in these cases, agency doctrine furnishes two 
conflicting insights into them. An agent becomes no less an agent on the basis of 
the nature of a principal’s claims against the agent. Even an agent who has 
acted in a manner totally contrary to the principal’s instructions and interests is 
still, vis-à-vis the principal, an agent; the principal otherwise would be unable to 
hold the agent to account for major breaches of duty.55 On the other hand, it 
does seem “odd,” as it did to the Fasciana court, that a principal would have 
agreed to fund its agent’s defense, in particular, that a corporation would retain 
outside counsel using a retention agreement that counsel’s defense costs would 
be “fronted” by the corporation in the event of a malpractice dispute.56 Those 
costs, like the cost of insuring against them, seem part of counsel’s cost of doing 
business, but not costs intertwined with the principal’s “enterprise.” Thus, the 
perspective of agency doctrine suggests the folly of “agents” as a trigger for 
categorical indemnification rights. 
B.  Officers and Advancements 
As the introduction notes, officers often act as a corporation’s agents but, 
especially at the most senior level, are also likely to work more intimately with 
its directors than are most “agents” who are situated externally to the 
corporation. Moreover, if an officer occupies a full-time position, the officer is 
not comparable to an externally situated agent with a separate “enterprise” 
distinct from the corporation, as principal, to which costs of litigation defense 
might conventionally be allocated. On the other hand, in large corporations, a 
senior officer’s role is more likely than that of a director to be associated with 
conduct that inflicts injury on the corporation and results in liability for the 
officer.57 In large corporations, operational decisions are the immediate 
responsibility of officers, as is the accuracy of the corporation’s financial 
statements. As part III notes, the MBCA (like other contemporary corporation 
statutes)58 permits the corporation’s directors to obligate it to make 
advancements to officers in connection with litigation and other proceedings 
brought against them because of their service as officers. The MBCA’s official 
comments highlight the potential gravity of including suits brought by the 
 
 53. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 17 (2000) 
(characterizing lawyers as agents albeit not typical ones). See generally Deborah A. DeMott, The 
Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (1998). 
 54. Jackson Walker L.L.P. v. Spira Footwear, Inc., No. 3150-VCP, 2008 WL 2487256, at *8 (Del. 
Ch. June 23, 2008). 
 55. For the principal’s duties vis-à-vis third parties when the agent acts adversely, the analysis is 
more complicated and beyond the modest scope of this article. 
 56. Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 829 A.2d 160, 172 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 57. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1656 (2007). 
 58. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(f) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (2010); N.Y. BUS. 
CORP. LAW §§ 723(c), 725(a) (McKinney 2010). 
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corporation itself within mandatory advancement provisions59 and suggest that it 
may be preferable “to retain the discretion to decide, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether to indemnify and advance expenses to employees and agents (and 
perhaps even officers, especially non-executive officers) rather than binding the 
corporation in advance to do so.”60 Anecdotal evidence suggests some 
corporations have had occasion to regret binding commitments to make 
advancements to executive officers as well, leaving them funding expensive 
defenses without strong prospects of recovering if, at the end, a now-former 
executive officer is not eligible to be indemnified.61 Thus, one might question 
whether the MBCA’s cautionary instincts go far enough. 
The backdrop of common-law agency, although not answering this question, 
casts it in a different light. The justification that underlies indemnification is, as 
developed by part II, internalizing, into the principal’s enterprise, its costs. 
Along these lines, the MBCA’s official comments, focusing on advancement, 
state that the underlying policy “is based on the view that a person who serves 
an entity in a representative capacity should not be required to finance his or 
her own defense.”62 Despite the use of the agency-feeling term “representative,” 
the MBCA’s perspective does not entirely replicate agency law’s insights 
because agency doctrine confers on the principal the right to control the 
defense of third-party litigation against an agent.63 That is, the defense is not 
entirely the agent’s own. Mirrored in the corporate context, this facet of agency 
doctrine would be consistent with the retention of greater control in the 
corporation’s board, just as the board exercises control over other litigation-
related costs that are part of the corporation’s enterprise. 
Agency doctrine’s broader implication stresses the significance of allowing a 
decisionmaker—here a corporation’s board of directors—to exercise discretion 
on an ongoing basis. For starters, well-settled agency doctrine empowers a 
principal to terminate its agent even though the termination breaches a contract 
between principal and agent.64 This doctrine reflects the consensual nature of 
agency and the relevance of the principal’s consent on an ongoing basis. 
However, the force of this doctrine is confined to the principal’s power to end 
its relationship with an agent; agency doctrine does not also empower a 
principal to renounce contracts it has made with agents when it comes to regret 
 
 59. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
 60. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.56 official cmt. (2008) (emphasis added). 
 61. For example, Brocade Communications funded a nearly $50 million defense of its former CEO 
against a host of criminal, SEC, and civil cases stemming from a scheme to backdate stock options. The 
corporation settled with its former CEO by making a payment of $12.5 million, while his defense costs 
were almost $50 million by the time of settlement. See Zusha Elinson, Brocade’s Closely Watched 
Backdating Lawsuit Ends in the Red, LAW.COM (June 6, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/ 
LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202431585820. 
 62. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.53 official cmt. (2008). 
 63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14 cmt. d (2008). 
 64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.10(1) (2006). The same doctrine empowers an agent 
to renounce its position albeit in breach of contract. 
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their consequences.65 At the point of contracting, and consistent with the 
MBCA’s cautions, a corporation’s board has the opportunity to consider how 
categorically and comprehensively to make a commitment to advancement, as 
well as the financial implications of that commitment in relation to third-party 
insurance the corporation may purchase.66 How a corporation’s insurer prices its 
director- and liability-insurance policies reflects, inter alia, the insurer’s 
assessment of risk;67 an insurer’s perception of relatively high risk should 
counsel caution in a board’s consideration of advancement obligations. 
A recent case illustrates how a board might implement a measure of 
caution. In Flood v. ClearOne Communications, Inc.,68 a year after the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the United States Department of Justice 
began investigating the conduct of a corporation’s CEO, the corporation agreed 
to advance and indemnify her costs of defense stemming from her tenure in 
office. The corporation’s undertaking to make advancements—one element of a 
comprehensive agreement that otherwise ended the CEO’s relationship with 
the corporation—was conditioned, inter alia, on a determination “that the facts 
then known to those making the determination would not preclude 
indemnification” under either the corporation’s bylaws or the corporation 
statute.69 In particular, the corporation’s bylaws prohibited indemnification 
absent a conclusion that it “has the financial ability to make the payment, and 
the financial resources of the corporation should be devoted to this use rather 
than some other use.”70 Although the corporation advanced its former CEO’s 
costs of defense in the wake of her criminal indictment, advancements ceased 
when the board determined that the CEO herself had reason to believe her 
prior conduct was neither legal nor in the corporation’s best interests, which 
belied an affirmation from the former CEO required under the bylaw.71 
Additionally, the board determined that the corporation’s best interests did not 
require continued advancements.72 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, 
which had preliminarily enjoined the corporation to continue making 
advancements on the reasoning that the conditions of the obligation rendered 
the obligation illusory.73 In the Tenth Circuit’s assessment, the obligation, far 
 
 65. Id. § 8.13. 
 66. If the costs of a defense outrun the coverage limits of an insurance policy, former officers may 
enforce the corporation’s obligation to make advancements. See Stockman v. Heartland Indus. 
Partners, L.P., No. 4227-VCS, 2009 WL 2096213, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2009). 
 67. Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details 
Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1175–78 
(2006). 
 68. Flood v. ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 1110, 1111–12 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 69. Id. at 1113. 
 70. Id. at 1112. 
 71. Id. at 1113. 
 72. Id. 
 73. The district court decided not to give effect to the express conditions, effectively reforming the 
terms of the parties’ agreement. See id. at 1119 (discussing Flood v. ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., No. 2:08-
CV-631, 2009 WL 87006, at *5 (D. Utah Jan. 12, 2009)). 
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from being illusory, was both enforceable and subject to expressly stated 
conditions that required determinations to be made in good faith by the board.74 
Although the specific occasion for the agreement in Flood was a senior 
officer’s separation from service, the case illustrates contractual mechanisms 
through which a board may retain control to exercise discretion on an ongoing 
basis as litigation and other developments provide additional material 
information about the recipient of advancements. Future revisions to the 
MBCA might nudge boards in the direction of retaining such discretion. Most 
strongly, the MBCA might require that such discretion be retained; 
alternatively, retained discretion could be cast as a default rule from which an 
individual board could derogate through explicit terms, either generically in the 
corporation’s general governance documents or in individual-by-individual 
determinations and agreements. Cast as a default rule, a mandate of retained 
discretion would require an informed decision by the board to proceed 
otherwise, likely preceded by a discussion aided by legal counsel of the 
prospective risks, costs, and benefits of the board’s decision. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Common-law agency doctrine answers simpler questions than those 
surrounding indemnification in the corporate context. Its perspective is 
nonetheless enlightening. Agency doctrine envisions risk-balancing through 
negotiation of indemnification terms between principal and agent. Corporate 
indemnification differs from this vision in several critical ways, complicating any 
attempt to apply common-law agency doctrine to the corporate context: 
corporate indemnification has a broader definition of “agent,” a wider field of 
liability subject to indemnification, the presence of structural bias among board 
members who tailor indemnification provisions favorably to appointed officers 
with whom the board shares a close or special relationship, and the inevitable 
self-interest of board members who themselves will be subject to generic 
indemnification terms. These differences distort efforts to balance risk, 
sometimes leading to absurd results. Future revisions to the MBCA should at 
least discuss, if not mandate, tactics that strengthen negotiation to create an 
environment conducive to indemnification and advancement agreements that 
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